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A Practical Roadmap to 50% Renewable Energy and Why Jamaica Should Not Stop There

  • Sherry DaRosa
  • Jul 14
  • 10 min read


Emanuel DaRosa speaks to why Jamaica is not currently moving at the pace required to achieve 50% renewable electricity 
by 2030.

JAMAICA’S ENERGY FUTURE: FROM AMBITION TO ACTION -Article 5 of 5

By Emanuel DaRosa


Over the course of this series, I have sought to establish five central points.

Jamaica is not currently moving at the pace required to achieve 50% renewable electricity

by 2030.


Uruguay has demonstrated that a country can transform its energy system when national

policy, institutional coordination, private capital, and long-term execution are aligned.

Solar energy must be a major part of Jamaica’s future, but solar without storage cannot

provide the firm and dependable electricity required by an isolated island grid.


Hurricane Melissa has given Jamaica both a warning and an opportunity: we can restore

the system that existed before the storm, or we can build the more resilient energy system

that should have existed all along.


The final question is therefore the most important:


What practical programme could move Jamaica from approximately 12.6% renewable

electricity toward 50%-and what should come after that?


Begin With the Energy Requirement


Jamaica currently generates approximately 4.3 million megawatt-hours of electricity each

year. Historical operating data indicate that the major renewable facilities and JPS

hydroelectric stations together contribute approximately 540,000 megawatt-hours

annually.


To reach 50% renewable electricity at today’s level of demand, renewable generation

would need to increase to approximately 2.1 million megawatt-hours annually. The current

shortfall is therefore approximately 1.6 million megawatt-hours per year.

That is the scale of the challenge. Expressing the target only as a percentage can make the gap appear abstract. Expressing it in actual energy makes the requirement much clearer.


Jamaica does not need a few additional renewable projects. It needs a coordinated

programme capable of supplying more than one million additional megawatt-hours of

dependable renewable electricity each year.


Existing Projects Are Important, but Insufficient


The renewable projects expected to enter service in 2027 will represent valuable progress.

SunTerra Energy Jamaica’s 50-megawatt solar project is expected to produce

approximately 130,000 megawatt-hours annually. Wigton’s 49.83-megawatt solar project

is expected to produce approximately 115,000 megawatt-hours annually.

Together, these projects should add approximately 245,000 megawatt-hours of renewable

electricity each year. This would increase Jamaica’s renewable share, but only to

approximately 18%, depending on total electricity demand and the performance of the

existing fleet.


That leaves Jamaica more than 30 percentage points short of the national target. This is not

a criticism of the projects. It is a recognition that the scale and pace of implementation

remain insufficient. Individual procurements of 50 or 100 megawatts every few years

cannot close the gap within the time available.


Jamaica Needs a Programme, Not a Sequence of Isolated Projects


The countries that have transformed their energy systems did not do so through

disconnected transactions. They established national programmes. A programme

approach provides:


• A defined quantity of energy to be delivered

• A clear implementation schedule

• Coordinated generation and transmission planning

• Standardized technical requirements

• Consistent environmental and social standards

• Repeatable project structures

• Greater certainty for investors and lenders

• Better coordination among Government agencies

• Lower development and financing costs

• Accountability for national outcomes


Instead of asking which single project should be procured next, Jamaica should define how much firm renewable energy the country requires, where it should be located, when it must be delivered, and what enabling infrastructure is needed.


That plan should then be divided into projects that can be financed and constructed in

parallel.


The Next Generation Must Be Firm Renewable Power

A major portion of Jamaica’s renewable gap should be filled by solar generation paired with appropriately sized battery storage. This is not simply because batteries are becoming

more affordable.


It is because Jamaica needs renewable energy that can perform functions currently

provided by thermal generation. A properly designed solar-plus-storage facility can:


• Supply energy after sunset

• Serve evening and nighttime demand

• Smooth short-term solar fluctuations

• Reduce the steep evening ramp

• Provide frequency response

• Support voltage control

• Supply operating and spinning reserves

• Reduce thermal-plant cycling

• Improve restoration capability

• Displace imported fuel more effectively


The strategic objective should be to convert abundant daytime sunlight into firm,

dispatchable electricity. That is fundamentally different from adding solar capacity that

must be accepted whenever the sun is available and replaced by fossil generation when it

is not.


A Practical Scale for National Transformation


One practical pathway would be a programme comprising several standardized,

geographically distributed solar-plus-storage facilities. For example, five projects, each

capable of delivering approximately 50 megawatts of firm renewable capacity, could

collectively provide:


• 250 megawatts of firm renewable capacity

• Approximately 700 megawatts of solar generation

• Approximately 1,600 megawatt-hours of battery storage

• Approximately 1.1 to 1.15 million megawatt-hours of renewable electricity annually


A programme of this scale could provide approximately one-quarter of Jamaica’s present

electricity requirement and close roughly 70% of the country’s existing renewable-energy

gap. Combined with current renewable generation and the projects already expected for

2027, it could place Jamaica within reach of its 50% objective.


The projects should be distributed geographically to reduce concentration risk, strengthen

different sections of the transmission system, and supply major load centres from multiple

directions. Potential locations should be selected based on:


• Available land

• Transmission capability

• Regional demand

• Planned retirement of thermal units

• Hurricane and flood exposure

• Environmental and social suitability

• Speed of development

• Ability to support grid restoration


The goal should not be to place all new generation in the location that is easiest for a

developer. The goal should be to build the portfolio that provides the greatest national

benefit.


Use Existing Thermal Assets More Strategically

Reaching 50% renewable electricity does not require Jamaica to immediately retire every

natural-gas or oil-fired generator. The transition must preserve system reliability. The

newest and most efficient natural-gas facilities should continue to provide:


• Backup during prolonged poor weather

• Support during major equipment outages

• Capacity during hurricanes and restoration events

• Reserves during unexpected demand increases

• Reliability while storage capacity is being expanded


Older and more expensive HFO and diesel units can be displaced first. As firm renewable

generation grows, efficient gas facilities can operate less frequently while remaining

available when required.


This allows Jamaica to reduce fuel consumption without compromising reliability. It also

recognizes an important commercial reality.


Jamaica Must Respect Its LNG Commitments


Jamaica should be commended for its decision to introduce liquefied natural gas into the

electricity sector. At the time, LNG represented a progressive and necessary step.

It improved fuel diversity. It reduced dependence on heavy fuel oil and automotive diesel. It

supported the development of more efficient combined-cycle generating facilities. It

lowered emissions compared with the petroleum fuels it displaced. It strengthened the

country’s ability to move away from older and less efficient generation.


Natural gas should therefore be understood for what it was intended to be: a transitional

fuel that provided Jamaica with important economic, environmental, and operational

benefits.


However, transitional does not mean temporary in the immediate sense. Jamaica’s LNG

infrastructure and fuel-supply arrangements were supported by long-term commercial

contracts.


Those contracts include minimum purchase or take-or-pay obligations under which

specified quantities of gas must be purchased, or paid for, whether or not the fuel is fully

used.


These obligations are real. They supported the investment required to construct LNG

receiving, storage, regasification, pipeline, and generation infrastructure. They cannot

simply be ignored because renewable technology has continued to advance.


If Jamaica reduces LNG consumption below its contractual minimums before those

arrangements expire or are renegotiated, consumers could face the perverse outcome of

paying for gas that the electricity system does not need. A responsible energy transition

must avoid that result.


Why 50% Is a Sensible Near-Term Balance


The 50% renewable target may therefore represent more than a climate or policy objective.

It may also offer a practical transitional balance. At approximately 50% renewable

electricity, Jamaica could:


• Dramatically reduce HFO and diesel generation

• Lower fuel imports

• Reduce foreign-exchange exposure

• Cut emissions

• improve energy-price stability

• Introduce firm renewable baseload

• Retain efficient gas generation for backup and balancing

• Continue meeting minimum LNG contractual obligations

• Protect reliability while the grid is modernized


This creates a managed transition rather than an abrupt substitution. Renewables would

carry a much larger share of annual energy. Natural gas would provide firm backup and

flexibility. Older, less efficient petroleum-fired generation could be reduced or retired.

Storage could be expanded in stages as technical experience grows and costs decline.

At the same time, the Government, JPS, the OUR, gas suppliers, and project sponsors

should begin planning now for the eventual expiry, restructuring, or renegotiation of LNG

commitments.


Why Stop at 50%?


Once Jamaica reaches 50%, the obvious question will be, why stop there? The answer

should be that Jamaica does not intend to stop at 50%.

Fifty per cent should be treated as a major milestone, not the final destination. However,

moving beyond it must be carefully sequenced with the country’s existing LNG obligations.

Until the minimum take-or-pay commitments expire, are renegotiated, or are otherwise

economically managed, pushing renewable generation materially beyond the level that

allows Jamaica to use its contracted gas volumes could impose avoidable costs on

consumers. The country could end up paying twice:


• Once for renewable electricity

• Again for LNG that is contractually committed but no longer required


That would undermine public confidence in the energy transition. The correct approach is

not to delay renewable planning. It is to coordinate renewable expansion with the declining

contractual requirement for LNG.


Jamaica should therefore develop two linked roadmaps:


Roadmap One: Reach 50%

Accelerate firm solar plus storage, reduce HFO and diesel generation, modernize the grid,

and use efficient LNG generation as the principal transitional backup resource.


Roadmap Two: Move Beyond 50%

As LNG minimum obligations decline or expire, add further renewable generation, longerduration storage, expanded hydro where feasible, demand-response programmes,

distributed energy resources, electric-vehicle integration, and other firm clean-energy

technologies.


This would allow Jamaica to move progressively toward 70%, 80%, 90%, or even higher

renewable penetration without imposing stranded fuel costs on consumers.

Planning Beyond the Contract Horizon


The LNG contract horizon should not become a reason for inaction. It should become a

planning deadline. Jamaica should determine:


• The remaining term of each material LNG obligation

• The annual minimum volumes that must be purchased

• The generation required to consume those volumes efficiently

• Opportunities to renegotiate flexibility

• Alternative industrial, transport, or regional uses for gas

• The schedule for reducing LNG dependence

• The renewable and storage capacity required at each stage

• The transmission upgrades needed for higher renewable penetration


This analysis should form part of a national integrated resource plan.

Investments made today should be designed so that they support both stages of the

transition. Battery facilities should be expandable. Solar sites should allow additional

generation. Transmission systems should accommodate future capacity. Control systems

should be capable of managing higher levels of inverter-based resources. Thermal assets

retained for backup should be selected based on efficiency and flexibility rather than

historical ownership or sunk cost.


Mobilizing Capital Already Available

Jamaica does not have to finance this transformation entirely from public funds.

Substantial private and institutional capital is available for well-structured renewable,

storage, resilience, and infrastructure projects. Local financial institutions, pension funds,

regional investment firms, development-finance institutions, climate funds, and

international lenders are all seeking bankable opportunities.


The country’s role is to create a framework that converts that interest into construction.

That requires:


• Clear policy direction

• Bankable long-term contracts

• Transparent risk allocation

• Timely approvals

• Coordinated interconnection planning

• Credible environmental and social safeguards

• Competitive and predictable tariffs

• Strong public accountability


Private capital can move quickly, but only when Government decisions create sufficient

certainty.


A National Delivery Structure


The transformation should be coordinated across Government rather than managed as a

sequence of disconnected agency decisions.


The Ministry responsible for energy must provide policy leadership. The OUR must protect

consumers and approve prudent arrangements. JPS must identify system requirements

and operate the grid reliably. Generation Procurement Entity processes must align with the

national timetable. NaRRA can help position resilient energy infrastructure within the wider

reconstruction programme. The Ministry of Finance must assess fiscal and contingentliability implications.


Private developers and financing partners must accept development, construction, and

performance risk.


No single institution can deliver the transformation alone. But coordinated institutions

can.


The Decision Before Jamaica


Jamaica now has a practical choice. We can continue adding individual renewable projects at intervals determined by conventional procurement cycles. Under that approach,

renewable penetration will improve gradually, but the country is unlikely to reach its

objective within the required timeframe.


Or Jamaica can adopt a programme approach. That would mean:


• Defining the renewable-energy gap

• Procuring firm energy rather than nameplate capacity alone

• Integrating storage from the outset

• Coordinating generation with transmission

• Mobilizing private capital at scale

• Accelerating projects that are ready to proceed

• Retaining efficient gas generation during the transition

• Aligning renewable expansion with LNG contractual obligations

• Preparing now for the period beyond those obligations


The technology exists. The capital exists. The technical expertise exists. The need is clear.

What remains is national alignment and execution.


Jamaica’s 50% renewable-energy target should not be regarded as the limit of our

ambition. It should be the foundation of the next stage.


We should move urgently to 50%, while responsibly managing the LNG commitments that

helped Jamaica transition away from more polluting fuels. Then, as those contractual

obligations expire or are restructured, Jamaica should be ready to move decisively beyond

50%.


The real question is therefore not whether Jamaica can reach a predominantly renewable

electricity system. The real question is whether we will begin planning for it now.



About This Series


Jamaica’s Energy Future: From Ambition to Action is a five-part series by Emanuel

DaRosa, former President and CEO of Jamaica Public Service Company and CEO of

SunTerra Energy. The series examines Jamaica’s progress toward its renewable-energy

goals, the operational realities of integrating renewable generation into an island electricity

system, and the practical steps required to build a more affordable, reliable, resilient, and

energy-independent Jamaica.


The articles are intended to contribute to a constructive national discussion involving

Government, regulators, utilities, investors, development partners, businesses, energy

professionals, academics, and consumers.


The Five-Part Series


Part 1 - Jamaica Is Not on Track to Reach 50% Renewable Energy by 2030

Jamaica’s current renewable-energy position, the scale of the remaining gap, and why

the present pace is insufficient.


Part 2 - What Uruguay Can Teach Jamaica About Energy Transformation

How long-term planning, policy certainty, national consensus, and private capital

transformed Uruguay’s electricity sector.


Part 3 - Why Solar Alone Will Not Get Jamaica to 50% Renewable Energy

Why installed capacity, annual energy, and firm power are different-and why storage is

essential for Jamaica’s grid.


Part 4 - Building a Resilient Energy System for Post-Melissa Jamaica

How national reconstruction can create stronger, geographically diverse, climateresilient energy infrastructure.


Part 5 - A Practical Roadmap to 50% Renewable Energy - and Why Jamaica Should Not

Stop There

A programme-based pathway to 50% and a responsible strategy for moving beyond it

while managing LNG commitments.



Readers who encounter the series out of sequence are encouraged to begin with Part 1 and continue through the articles in order, as each builds upon the analysis and conclusions of the previous instalments.


Follow Emanuel DaRosa and SunTerra Energy on LinkedIn for the remaining articles and

future discussion on Jamaica’s energy transformation.

 
 
 

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